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Mr Charles Darwin, well known to us all as the author
of the delightful travel book Journal of Researches into
the Geology and Natural History of the Various
Countries Visited by HMS Beagle (1839) (better known
as The Voyage of the Beagle), has now produced an
audacious work that will surely be the topic of much
conversation for months if not years to come. In his
newly published book, On the Origin of Species by
Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of the
Favoured Races in the Struggle for Existence, to give it
the full title, Mr Darwin openly declares himself a
Vestiginarian! Like the unknown author of the Vestiges
of the Natural History of Creation (1844), Mr Darwin
has embraced transmutationism, what Mr Herbert
Spencer calls ‘‘evolution,’’ and what Mr Darwin him-
self calls ‘‘descent with modification.’’ In his new
book—to which we will give the abbreviated title of the
Origin—Mr Darwin openly declares that all living
creatures (quick and dead) are the end results of a long
process of natural development from (as he says) ‘‘one
or a few forms.’’ And although his book says little
about our own species, he makes very clear at the end
that we too are part of the picture. ‘‘Light will be
thrown on the origin of man and of his history.’’ Yes,
indeed!
So would open a review of the Origin written shortly
after the book appeared in 1859. I am writing in 2006,
close to the 150th anniversary of the publication, and
(declaring an interest) I should tell you that I have just
signed a contract with Cambridge University Press to
co-edit (with the distinguished historian Robert J.
Richards) a Companion to the Origin. So I take it
without argument that as a historical work the Origin is
of great significance. Goodness, the portrait of Darwin
has even replaced Charles Dickens on the back of the
English ten pound note, although rumor has it that the
real reason for the shift is that Darwin had a fuller
beard than Dickens and thus was less easy to forge! My
mandate here is to assess the Origin from today’s
perspective, considering its contemporary value as a
work of scholarship, and in respects this is a lot less
easy to do than from the perspective of say 1860. It
would be all too easy simply to dismiss it as something
irretrievably dated and to leave matters at that.
Frankly, I would be worried if one could not dismiss it
as dated, for that would suggest that Darwin’s ideas
have so little interest or value that no one has bothered
to try to critique them or to take the discussion further.
So remember that here I am not so much suspending
critical evaluation, as looking at what proved interest-
ing and stimulating in the Origin, rather than ways to
take cheap shots at the past from the present.1
M. Ruse (&)
Department of Philosophy, Florida State University,
Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA
e-mail: mruse@mailer.fsu.edu
1 I do not want to spend the whole of this review referencing
myself. So here let me say that four of my books that deal with
Darwin and his revolution are The Darwinian Revolution: Sci-
ence Red in Tooth and Claw [1999 (1979)], Monad to Man: The
Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology (1996), Mystery of
Mysteries: Is Evolution a Social Construction? (1999), and Dar-
win and Design: Does Evolution have a Purpose? (2003). Two
books that look at the science in Darwin and compare it to the
present are Darwinism and its Discontents (2006) and Charles
Darwin (2007). Two books dealing with evolution and religion
are Can a Darwinian be a Christian? The Relationship between
Science and Religion (2001) and The Evolution-Creation Struggle
(2005). A book which looks at Freud on homosexuality was
Homosexuality: A Philosophical Analysis (1988).
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Let us turn to the content of Darwin’s book, but as we
do so, let us keep in mind something as important today
as it was yesterday. Although, when he published the
Origin, Darwin had been stricken for 20 years with
ongoing ill health, he had nevertheless pushed himself
to the very first rank of British scientists. His detailed
geological studies, based on his 5-year-long circum-
navigation of the world in HMS Beagle under the
captaincy of Robert Fitzroy, were models of empirical
inquiry. His massive detailed studies of barnacles, both
living and fossil, were exemplary instances of careful
and thoughtful study of the world of life. We may or may
not agree with Darwin’s reasoning. We must respect it
and cannot ignore it. Today no less than yesterday we
feel at once that we are in the hands of a master. This is
not some outsider trying his hand. This is a real pro-
fessional at work. We can add also that whether or not
we agree with Darwin, his warm and easy style makes it
exceptionally easy to follow his thinking. Few will come
away confused as to the points that he is making. The
charming writing of the Voyage of the Beagle is once
again in evidence. Some may complain—in fact in 1860
his bitter rival the anatomist Richard Owen, writing in
the Quarterly Review, did complain—that the style is
too easy for a serious work of science. With this I can
only disagree. Too often specialists feel that, save their
writing is opaque and cumbersome, they are not being
serious and profound. I am not saying that (in his style)
Darwin has the brilliance of Richard Dawkins in the
Selfish Gene (1976). But he is very good. Would that
German metaphysicians and French deconstructivists
took lessons from him.
Darwin begins by taking the reader into the world of
the breeder—the farmer who wants fatter pigs and
hairier sheep, the enthusiast who wants ever more fan-
ciful feathers on his pigeon—and he argues that this is a
model for change in nature. Here, as throughout his
book, Darwin is riding two horses and it is not always
clear which back is mounted at any one time. From the
one saddle, Darwin thinks that the changes brought
about by the breeders are enough to support the changes
he supposes through nature. We confess we are not
convinced of this. Who ever changes a horse into a cow?
From the other saddle, Darwin prepares the way for his
mechanism of change by showing how selection of the
desired is the way that breeders bring about the changes
that they effect. This is surely true, although whether
selection by breeders is truly analogous to what Darwin
calls ‘‘natural selection’’ is indeed the big question at
issue. Judging from today, general opinion would be that
Darwin was just scratching at the surface but that he was
scratching at the right surface. We now have massive
evidence of the power of selection in artificial and semi-
artificial circumstances, and can change organisms so
much that they are really new species, isolated from all
others. It is true that we have never changed a horse into
a cow, but then neither did nature. They spring from
common stock.
Moving to his main mechanism, Darwin first makes
reference to the deductions of the Reverend Robert
Malthus [1914 (1826)], who showed how readily pop-
ulation numbers outstrip supplies of food and space.
Here Darwin’s genius glows as brightly today as it ever
did. With reason, the calculations of Malthus were
generally taken to show the impossibility of major
change. If you feed the poor from state funds in one
generation, you only have more of them in the next.
There is bound to be a struggle for existence, save only
people practice prudential restraint. Darwin takes the
struggle as force that brings on unlimited change, for in
the world of animals and plants there can be no pru-
dential restraint, and so in the bloody battle for sur-
vival those with advantageous features will tend to
succeed. Let us quote Darwin on this.
Let it be borne in mind in what an endless number
of strange peculiarities our domestic productions,
and, in a lesser degree, those under nature, vary;
and how strong the hereditary tendency is. Under
domestication, it may be truly said that the whole
organisation becomes in some degree plastic. Let
it be borne in mind how infinitely complex and
close-fitting are the mutual relations of all organic
beings to each other and to their physical condi-
tions of life. Can it, then, be thought improbable,
seeing that variations useful to man have
undoubtedly occurred, that other variations useful
in some way to each being in the great and com-
plex battle of life, should sometimes occur in the
course of thousands of generations? If such do
occur, can we doubt (remembering that many
more individuals are born than can possibly sur-
vive) that individuals having any advantage, how-
ever slight, over others, would have the best
chance of surviving and of procreating their kind?
On the other hand, we may feel sure that any
variation in the least degree injurious would be
rigidly destroyed. This preservation of favourable
variations and the rejection of injurious variations,
I call Natural Selection (Darwin 1859, pp 80–81).
(Note that he does not use the alternative phrase,
survival of the fittest. This was a phrase coined by
Spencer, and Darwin only added it to later editions of
the Origin at the urging of Alfred Russel Wallace, the
co-discoverer of natural selection.)
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Darwin has many most interesting things to say
about natural selection, a process that he argues leads
to the wonderful display of fossils in the geological
record as well as the multitudinous animals and plants
living today. It is still amusing that Darwin appropri-
ates a Christian metaphor when he speaks of history as
a ‘‘Tree of Life,’’ with us all today at the outer tips of
the branches. It is worth also noting in passing that
Darwin’s mechanism of natural selection shows roots
in the Christian faith. It leads to adaptations or con-
trivances like the hand and the eye. In other words, it
supposes that nature is not thrown together randomly
but is organized and it works. In the language of the
philosophers, the eye shows final cause in seeing and
the hand shows final cause in grasping. Here Darwin
shows the effects of his training and reading. Passages
of the Origin would not be out of place in Archdeacon
Paley’s Natural Theology [1819 (1802)] or one of the
celebrated Bridgewater Treatises (Gillespie 1950).
Darwin would never agree with today’s neo-Creation-
ists, the Intelligent Design Theorists, that we need
interventions from outside the course of nature to
explain the adaptive complexity of organisms, but he
does agree with them that adaptation is the chief
feature of organic life.
Natural selection leading to adaptation is of course
the first of Darwin’s big contributions to evolutionary
theory. Paradoxically, writing today in 2006 we are
more inclined to give him credit than his contempo-
raries in 1859. Today, although there are still doubters
about the ubiquity of natural selection—for instance,
the late Stephen Jay Gould (2002)—general opinion
among professional evolutionists is that Darwin got it
right. The chief feature of the organic world is its
adaptive or organized complexity [as the late John
Maynard Smith (1969) used to call it] and natural
selection is the only mechanism that speaks to this.
(Darwin’s secondary mechanism of sexual selection is
also involved, although some simply subsume it be-
neath natural selection.) Darwin in the Origin does not
offer much direct evidence and today again this is a
place where time has moved on. We now have massive
evidence of the workings of selection in nature. Very
well known are the studies done in the 1950s by H.B.D.
Kettlewell (1973) on industrial melanism in butterflies,
and the studies for the past 30 years by Peter (1986)
and Rosemary Grant (1989) in the Galapagos Archi-
pelago on Darwin’s Finches. But they are just the tip of
a huge iceberg. Of great practical importance is the fact
that there has never been a medicine introduced that
did not become ineffective in its original state because
the rapid selection fueled evolution of the attacking
microorganisms.
The second part of the Origin, by far the bigger
section, is Darwin’s second great contribution to evo-
lutionary theory, and it too is as significant today as it
ever was. This part is given to a review of biological
discussions in different fields in the light of the mech-
anism of natural selection. The approach taken here,
namely using descent through natural selection to ex-
plain phenomena and in turn using the explanations to
support descent through natural selection, is not Dar-
win’s own invention. It is the method of scientific
argumentation championed by William Whewell in his
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840). Whewell
referred to this as a ‘‘Consilience of Inductions.’’ Just
like Newton before him and the geologists establishing
plate tectonics after him, Darwin did a terrific and still
powerful job of promoting a consilience. Paradoxically
and rather sadly, Whewell was so opposed to what he
thought were the irreligious aspects of Darwin’s theory
that, in his position of Master of Trinity College
Cambridge, he refused to allow the Origin on the
college library’s shelves.
With superb confidence, which time has only bur-
nished, Darwin takes us through the branches of his
subject—instinct, paleontology, the geographical dis-
tributions of organisms on the globe, classification,
morphology, embryology, and much, much more. It is
hard to pick out one topic rather than another, but
geography deserves special praise. Why, Darwin asks,
are the inhabitants of islands off the coast of Africa
similar although not identical to the inhabitants of
Africa? Why are they not like the inhabitants of South
America? Why conversely are the inhabitants of is-
lands off the coast of South American—including the
well-known Galapagos Archipelago—like the inhabit-
ants of South America and not like the inhabitants of
Africa? Can there be any explanation except descent
with modification?
The most striking and important fact for us in
regard to the inhabitants of islands, is their
affinity to those of the nearest mainland, without
being actually the same species. Numerous in-
stances could be given of this fact. I will give only
one, that of the Galapagos Archipelago, situated
under the equator, between 500 and 600 miles
from the shores of South America. Here almost
every product of the land and water bears the
unmistakeable stamp of the American continent.
There are twenty-six land birds, and twenty-five
of those are ranked by Mr Gould as distinct
species, supposed to have been created here; yet
the close affinity of most of these birds to
American species in every character, in their
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habits, gestures, and tones of voice, was manifest.
So it is with the other animals, and with nearly all
the plants, as shown by Dr. Hooker in his admi-
rable memoir on the Flora of this archipelago.
The naturalist, looking at the inhabitants of these
volcanic islands in the Pacific, distant several
hundred miles from the continent, yet feels that
he is standing on American land. Why should this
be so? Why should the species which are sup-
posed to have been created in the Galapagos
Archipelago, and nowhere else, bear so plain a
stamp of affinity to those created in America?
There is nothing in the conditions of life, in the
geological nature of the islands, in their height or
climate, or in the proportions in which the several
classes are associated together, which resembles
closely the conditions of the South American
coast: in fact there is a considerable dissimilarity
in all these respects. On the other hand, there is a
considerable degree of resemblance in the volca-
nic nature of the soil, in climate, height, and size
of the islands, between the Galapagos and Cape
de Verde Archipelagos: but what an entire and
absolute difference in their inhabitants! The
inhabitants of the Cape de Verde Islands are re-
lated to those of Africa, like those of the Gala-
pagos to America. I believe this grand fact can
receive no sort of explanation on the ordinary
view of independent creation; whereas on the
view here maintained, it is obvious that the
Galapagos Islands would be likely to receive
colonists, whether by occasional means of trans-
port or by formerly continuous land, from
America; and the Cape de Verde Islands from
Africa; and that such colonists would be liable to
modifications; the principle of inheritance still
betraying their original birthplace (pp 397–398).
This explanation is as vital and good today as it was
in 1859.
Again, to take a topic much discussed in 1859 by the
anatomists and still discussed today by anatomists, why
do the forelimbs of animals show similarities—what
Richard Owen (1848) called homologies—when they
are used for different ends? ‘‘What can be more curious
than that the hand of a man, formed for grasping, that of
a mole for digging, the leg of the horse, the paddle of
the porpoise, and the wing of the bat, should all be
constructed on the same pattern, and should include the
same bones, in the same relative positions?’’ Replies
Darwin: ‘‘The explanation is manifest on the theory of
the natural selection of successive slight modifications,
each modification being profitable in some way to the
modified form, but often affecting by correlation of
growth other parts of the organisation. In changes of
this nature, there will be little or no tendency to modify
the original pattern, or to transpose parts.’’
There is more, much more, that we could mention.
But the time has now come to turn to discussion.
Darwin established beyond reasonable doubt, as they
say in courts of law, that descent with modification
accounts for the history of life and the spread of
organisms we find today. There is no other way, natu-
rally, to account for the facts that Darwin brings to our
attention. On the evidence offered in the Origin, there
is less of a case for the mechanism natural selection. As
has been noted above, time has remedied that omission
and today selection rules supreme. What we do not get
from the Origin (and this was noted by the reviewers of
the day) is really helpful information on how features
are transmitted from one generation to another and
what causes new features. Darwin discusses these is-
sues at length but is more anecdotal than persuasive.
As we now know in 2006, in the twentieth century the
true principles of heredity—going back to the work of
the Moravian monk Gregor Mendel living at the same
time as Darwin—have been uncovered and developed.
We now have a full theory of genetics and it is the
backbone of modern evolutionary theory—a backbone
supporting the full force of Darwinian selection.
In fairness I should say that there are those who
think that some of the advances in the areas of biology
explained by selection—paleontology, embryology,
and so forth—require new principles that make selec-
tion ineffective and perhaps even misleading. Stephen
Jay Gould was a big one for arguing in this way, pro-
posing his theory of punctuated equilibrium (where
evolution proceeds in jumps or starts) as an alternative
to Darwinian selection (Eldredge and Gould 1972).
Unfortunately, neither Gould nor any of the other
critics have been able to provide an adequate alterna-
tive theory of heredity to explain something like
punctuated equilibrium. Mendelism (including its
molecular successor) has no place for such jumps or
starts (Stebbins and Ayala 1981). Recently, it is the
students of embryology, now known as evolutionary
development, or evo-devo, who have been trying to
break the Darwinian ties. Three leading proponents,
referring to some incredible homologies that have now
been found down at the molecular level—the devel-
opmental genes of the fruitfly and the human are
practically identical—write:
The homologies of process within morphogenetic
fields provide some of the best evidence for
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evolution—just as skeletal and organ homologies
did earlier. Thus, the evidence for evolution is
better than ever. The role of natural selection in
evolution, however, is seen to play less an
important role. It is merely a filter for unsuc-
cessful morphologies generated by development.
Population genetics is destined to change if it is
not to become as irrelevant to evolution as
Newtonian mechanics is to contemporary physics
(Gilbert et al. 1996, p 368).
As with punctuated equilibrium these are fears or
claims that are exaggerated. It now seems that organ-
isms are not built on new principles each time. They
are more like Lego creations, where the same pieces
are used again and again to make very different end
results. Why this should be a worry for Darwin or a
challenge for natural selection entirely escapes me.
Finally, let us ask the question that (in America
particularly) is as much at the fore of the minds of
people today as it was at the fore of the minds of
Darwin’s contemporaries. How far can one go with
Darwin if one is a practicing, believing Christian? If
one believes that Jesus was God Incarnate, who died
on the Cross for our sins, and makes possible our
eternal salvation, can one accept descent with modifi-
cation? My answer today is that which most people,
including most practicing Christians (excluding the
American South) gave back then. It is many years now
since either scientists or the layman felt constrained by
literal readings of Genesis. No one believes in the date
set by Archbishop Ussher, that the world is but
6,000 years old. More positively, remember how Dar-
win’s mechanism of natural selection speaks directly to
the significance of design, of final cause. If evolution be
true, there is no reason why God should not have
created through law rather than miracle. After all,
would we say that the Briton who builds a power loom
to make his cloth is less worthy as a man than the one
who persists in using a hand loom?
Christians in the past and Christians today have
reservations about Homo sapiens. Darwin clearly
wants to include us in the picture, and as far as our
mortal frame is concerned, there can be no objection.
But as creatures made in the image of God, as beings
with immortal souls, many believers will balk. They
will call for divine intervention. And perhaps at this
point Darwin and his followers can lean back and give
Christians their case. A soul may be real—more real
than most—yet not a proper object of scientific inves-
tigation. I am not saying that one must believe in
souls—Darwin did not and neither do I—but I am
saying that if Christians want to believe in souls, who is
to deny them that pleasure.
How does one judge the Origin overall from 2006? I
find a comparison with Freud very enlightening. (A
comparison with Marx may make the same point.) I
have read a great deal of Freud’s writings very carefully.
I do not think of myself as a Freud expert as (immod-
estly) I would think of myself as a Darwin expert, but I
think I can talk knowledgeably about his ideas. Some, if
not just about all, of Freud’s writings I find very excit-
ing. He like Darwin can write in a terrific way and make
his ideas understandable and compelling at the mo-
ment. I recognize fully that Freud has been very influ-
ential. Has he been more influential than Darwin? I
don’t know and don’t much care. They have both been
very influential, and not just in their own fields but in
culture generally. There are many ideas in Freud that I
think are absolutely spot on—much more so than the
ideas of some of his followers. For instance, it seems to
me to be absolutely the case that homosexual males
tend to have close relationships with mother and diffi-
cult relationships with father. Not all homosexuals, not
all mothers, not all fathers, but many—more so than
with heterosexual males [Freud 1955 (1905)].
Yet when all is said and done I just don’t think that
Freud got it. I just don’t think that he had a basic
theory of human nature that works or that is true of the
empirical world. Insights but not truth. In the case of
homosexual males, Freud argues that it is the dys-
functional triangle that brings on the orientation. You
cannot successfully resolve the Oedipus tensions be-
cause you want to have sex with mother, you know you
can’t, and so you revert to a childhood state of being
attracted to males, and the tension is resolved. That
seems to me just plain wrong. Freud got it backwards.
Boys are born with their orientations and it is they who
elicit the behavior rather than the parents who impose
it. A gay son in the making wants to play with mum a
lot more than with dad, and so the attitudes evolve and
harden. There was no chap called Oedipus, it was not
engrained in human nature by Lamarckian (inheri-
tance of acquired characteristics) processes, and I very
much doubt that most male homosexuals really want to
romp between the sheets with their mothers.
Darwin is different. You can criticize as much as you
like. He did get things wrong and he did offer too little
evidence too often. But ultimately he was right. He
grasped the truth about the way that the world is. It is
as simple as that. Evolution is true and natural selec-
tion is its mechanism. No more but certainly no less. So
let us end by going back to the Origin and to its final
words. We are given a paragraph of poetry in prose,
somewhat ironically modified from a review Darwin
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read in 1838, by the Scottish physicist David Brewster,
on a work of positivism by August Comte. You will not
be surprised to learn that Brewster was praising God.
The naturalist Charles Darwin praises evolution.
It is interesting to contemplate an entangled
bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds,
with birds singing on the bushes, with various
insects flitting about, and with worms crawling
through the damp earth, and to reflect that these
elaborately constructed forms, so different from
each other, and dependent on each other in so
complex a manner, have all been produced by
laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the
largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction;
inheritance which is almost implied by reproduc-
tion; Variability from the indirect and direct
action of the external conditions of life, and from
use and disuse; a Ratio of Increase so high as to
lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence
to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of
Character and the Extinction of less-improved
forms. Thus, from the war of nature, from famine
and death, the most exalted object which we are
capable of conceiving, namely, the production of
the higher animals, directly follows. There is
grandeur in this view of life, with its several
powers, having been originally breathed into a
few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet
has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of
gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms
most beautiful and most wonderful have been,
and are being, evolved (pp 489–490).
Envoi
Even a friendly critic might complain that the Origin is
too circumscribed with respect to the broader impli-
cations of the theory of evolution through natural
selection. Was it enough for Charles Darwin simply to
acknowledge that his theory has things of interest and
importance to say about the human species and then
leave things at that? Surely, Darwin should have ex-
plored these matters in some detail? After all, others
were quick to do so, from Darwin’s great supporter
Thomas Henry Huxley in his Man’s Place in Nature
(1863) down to philosopher Dan Dennett’s recent
book, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phe-
nomenon (2006). Did Darwin not owe us some dis-
cussion about whether evolution—natural selection
even—has full application to the human species? What
about culture? Surely Darwin should have told us
whether he thought humans are like animals and
basically powered by biology alone, or if we have
escaped our animal heritage and live purely in a world
of (human-constructed) culture?
With hindsight, we can exonerate Darwin, even if we
do not agree with all of his ideas. On the negative side
(if such it be), Darwin deliberately excluded humans
from the main discussion of the Origin (although note
that he does include us when he is discussing such
things as vertebrate homologies). His aim in the Origin
was to get the basic ideas of his theory out on the table.
He knew full well that as soon as he published, the
‘‘monkey question’’ would be on everybody’s mind,
and so he was making sure that his central thinking
would not get lost in the rush. In this, he was very
successful. Virtually every review of the day brought
up the human question, but every review of the day
first gave detailed coverage of the main points of the
theory. That was a crucial point. No one thought the
Origin was simply special pleading about humankind.
It made it a great deal easier for people, including
(especially including) religious people, to accept evo-
lution. They could even accept evolution for hu-
mans—although they usually wanted miracles for
immortal souls—because the real case was being made
for non-humans. Accept it for dogs and cats, for oak
trees and elm trees, and it was a lot easier to agree that
we humans really cannot stand alone.
Second, on the positive side, 12 years later Darwin
did broach the human question fully in his Descent of
Man (1871). He was not a paleoanthropologist (student
of the history of humankind) and so much of the
empirical matter came from others, but Darwin made
it very clear that he did think that we humans come
fully under the evolutionary umbrella. In respects, he is
not always that tuned to the questions that we now find
fascinating. I am never quite sure whether Darwin
thinks that humans are biologically determined or
greatly controlled by selection [as one finds in the
writings of someone like the sociobiologist Edward O.
Wilson, author of On Human Nature (1978)], or whe-
ther he thinks that culture is now autonomous [as is
argued by many philosophers, recently by David Buller
in his Adapting Minds (2005)]. Probably a bit of both,
with an inclination to the biology.
In other respects, the discussion today picks up with
the Descent. Darwin spends considerable time dis-
cussing the nature of morality and its roots in selection,
trying to puzzle out how something that starts in a
struggle of one against the other can nevertheless
generate a sense of duty of one to others. His solution
in part invokes what we today call ‘‘reciprocal altru-
ism,’’ namely you be nice to me and I will be nice to
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you. In part, it invokes what today we call ‘‘group
selection,’’ where Darwin thought that help given
within the population gives maximum protection from
threats from without the population. Here he stands in
line with the authors of Unto Others: The Evolution of
Altruism (1997), biologist David Sloan Wilson and
philosopher Elliott Sober. Darwin’s discussion of reli-
gion, although brief, is even more up-to-date, as he
provides a naturalistic account of its origins, arguing
that it is rooted in the animal tendency to see intelli-
gence even when none exists. He is not contemptuous
of religion, as is Dennett, and explicitly he argues (in
direct opposition to E.O. Wilson) that a naturalistic
account of origins in itself can tell us nothing of truth or
falsity of content, but he anticipates people like cul-
tural theorist Pascal Boyer [Religion Explained (2002)]
and anthropologist Scott Atran [In Gods We Trust
(2004)] in seeing religion as something that is basically
a side-effect of selection for useful characteris-
tics—looking for intelligent agents being of prime
importance for organisms who are either predator or
prey or both.
I do not want to make too much of all of this, but I
am sure that today Charles Darwin would be entering
vigorously not only into scientific implications, revi-
sions, and extensions of his theory, but also into the
broader issues, especially centering on that ever-fasci-
nating organism, H. sapiens2.
References
Atran S (2004) In Gods we trust: the evolutionary landscape of
religion. Oxford University Press, New York
Boyer P (2002) Religion explained: the evolutionary origins of
religious thought. Basic Books, New York
Brewster D (1838) Review of Comte’s ‘Cours de Philosophie
Positive’. Edinburgh Rev 67:271–308
Buller D (2005) Adapting minds: evolutionary psychology and
the persistent quest for human nature. MIT, Cambridge
Chambers R (1844) Vestiges of the natural history of creation.
Churchill, London
Darwin C (1839) Journal of researches into the geology and
natural history of the various countries visited by HMS
Beagle. Henry Colburn, London
Darwin C (1859) On the origin of species. John Murray, London
Darwin C (1871) The descent of man. John Murray, London
Dawkins R (1976) The selfish gene. Oxford University Press,
Oxford
Dennett DC (2006) Breaking the spell: religion as a natural
phenomenon. Viking, New York
Eldredge N, Gould SJ (1972) Punctuated equilibria: an alterna-
tive to phyletic gradualism. In: Schopf TJM (ed) Models in
paleobiology. Freeman, Cooper, San Francisco, pp 82–115
Freud S [1955 (1905)] Three essays on the theory of sexuality. In:
The standard edition of the complete psychological works of
Sigmund Freud, vol 7. Hogarth, London, pp 125–243
Gilbert SF, Opitz JM, Raff RA (1996) Resynthesizing evolu-
tionary and developmental biology. Dev Biol 173:357–372
Gillespie CC (1950) Genesis and geology. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge
Gould SJ (2002) The structure of evolutionary theory. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge
Grant PR (1986) Ecology and evolution of Darwin’s finches.
Princeton University Press, Princeton
Grant RB, Grant PR (1989) Evolutionary dynamics of a natural
population: the large cactus finch of the Galapagos. Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, Chicago
Huxley TH (1863) Evidence as to man’s place in nature.
Williams and Norgate, London
Kettlewell HBD (1973) The evolution of melanism. Clarendon,
Oxford
Malthus TR [1914 (1826)] An essay on the principle of
population, 6th edn. Everyman, London
Maynard Smith J (1969) The status of neo-Darwinism. In:
Waddington CH (ed) Towards a theoretical biology. Edin-
burgh University Press, Edinburgh
Owen R (1848) On the archetype and homologies of the
vertebrate skeleton. Voorst, London
Owen R (1860) Darwin on the origin of species. Edinburgh Rev
111:487–532
Paley W [1819 (1802)] Natural theology (collected works: IV).
Rivington, London
Ruse M [1999 (1979)] The Darwinian revolution: science red in
tooth and claw, 2nd edn. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago
Ruse M (1988) Homosexuality: a philosophical inquiry. Black-
well, Oxford
Ruse M (1996) Monad to man: the concept of progress in
evolutionary biology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Ruse M (1999) Mystery of mysteries: is evolution a social
construction? Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Ruse M (2001) Can a Darwinian be a Christian? The relationship
between science and religion. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge
Ruse M (2003) Darwin and design: does evolution have a
purpose? Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Ruse M (2005) The evolution-creation struggle. Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge
Ruse M (2006) Darwinism and its discontents. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Ruse M (2007) Charles Darwin. Blackwell, Oxford
Sober E, Wilson DS (1997) Unto others: the evolution of
altruism. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Stebbins GL, Ayala FJ (1981) Is a new evolutionary synthesis
necessary? Science 213:967–971
Whewell W (1840) The philosophy of the inductive sciences, 2
vols. Parker, London
Wilson EO (1978) On human nature. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge
2 These and related topics are the subjects of discussion in my
new book Charles Darwin (2007).
Topoi (2007) 26:159–165 165
123
